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Conceptualising Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need 
1 
2 
3 Abstract 
4 
5 
In liberal political theory, meaningful work is a preference in the market. Although 
7 
8 this avoids transgressing liberal neutrality, the subsequent constraint upon state intervention 
9 
10 
aimed at promoting the social and economic conditions for widespread meaningful work is 
12 
13 normatively unsatisfactory. Instead, meaningful work can be understood to be a fundamental 
14 
15 human need, which all persons require in order to satisfy their inescapable interests in 
16 
17 
18 freedom, autonomy and dignity. To overcome the inadequate treatment of meaningful work 
19 
20 by liberal political theory, I situate the good of meaningful work within a liberal perfectionist 
21 
22 
framework, from which standpoint I develop a normative justification for making meaningful 
24 
25 work the object of political action. To understand the content of meaningful work, I make use 
26 
27 
of Susan Wolf’s distinct value of meaningfulness, in which she brings together the 
29 
30 dimensions of objectivity and subjectivity into the ‘bipartite value’ of meaningfulness (BVM) 
31 
32 (Wolf, 2010). However, in order to be able to incorporate the BVM into our lives, we must 
33 
34 
35 become valuers, that is, co-creators of values and meanings. This demands that we acquire 
36 
37 the relevant capabilities and status as co-authorities in the realm of value. I conclude that 
38 
39 
meaningful work is of first importance because it is a fundamental human need, and that 
41 
42 society ought to be arranged to allow as many people as possible to experience their work as 
43 
44 
meaningful through the development of the relevant capabilities. 
46 
47 For consideration by Philosophical Foundations 
48 
49 
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50 
51 
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Introduction 
1 
2 
3 
‘Working is about the search for daily meaning as well as daily bread, for 
5 
6 recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than torpor; in short, for 
7 
8 
a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday sort of dying’. (Terkel, 
10 
11 1975: 1) 
12 
13 
14 In advanced industrialised societies, work occupies a peculiarly ambivalent position – 
15 
16 
simultaneously valued for providing the means for self-realisation and disvalued for being 
18 
19 burdensome and compulsory. Shershow (2005) describes work as consisting of a ‘double 
20 
21 
necessity’, whereby ‘we see ourselves both as working to live and as living to work’ (ibid: 13, 
23 
24 original emphasis). Work is either a source of expressive human action, one of ‘the hopes of 
25 
26 
civilisation’ (Morris, 1993), fulfilled in a correctly ordered society which enables all persons 
27 
28 
29 to do decent, humane and dignified work; or it is an experience of oppressive degradation, 
30 
31 from which we must escape, since the worker deprived of worthwhile activities ‘generally 
32 
33 
34 becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’ (Smith, 
35 
36 1999 [1776]), resulting in him becoming ‘a crippled monstrosity’ (Marx, 1978 [1867]). 
37 
38 
Despite the many ways in which our daily experience of work falls short of 
40 
41 meaningfulness, the ideal of meaningful work retains a strong hold upon our imagination. In 
42 
43 
this paper, I aim to show that the conceptual evaluation of meaningful work is not simply an 
45 
46 exercise in remote abstraction, but directs us toward the pragmatic political possibility of 
47 
48 ensuring that all work possesses the structure for meaningfulness. Following Kovacs (1986), I 
49 
50 
51 take work to be ‘a basic mode of being in the world’, where ‘to work means to humanise the 
52 
53 world and to produce something’ (ibid: 198). In this sense, work functions to create and to 
54 
55 
sustain values and meanings beyond the realm of its economic productivity: work is a mode 
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of being in the world which transcends the employment relation to include all the activities 
1 
2 which contribute to producing and reproducing a complex system of social cooperation. 
3 
4 
5 But if work is to humanise the world, it must at the same time humanise the one 
6 
7 through whom the work takes place. In William Morris’s words: ‘Nothing should be made by 
8 
9 
man’s labour which is not worth doing; or which must be made by labour degrading to the 
11 
12 makers’ (Morris, 1884). Work cannot be meaningful if it requires the enslavement of the 
13 
14 
worker, the deformation of her human capabilities, or the misrecognition of her vital 
16 
17 commitments. If non-meaningful work visits avoidable harms upon people, then the 
18 
19 
widespread institution of meaningful work is a proper moral and political project – and even 
20 
21 
22 a necessary element in addressing the many challenges of our times, including how 
23 
24 increasingly unequal societies unevenly distribute the benefits and burdens of the work of 
25 
26 
social cooperation.1 
28 
29 I ground my reasons for making meaningful work for all a political project in a 
30 
31 
normative argument that being able to experience one’s life as meaningful is a fundamental 
33 
34 human need, which, under present economic arrangements, is extremely difficult for most 
35 
36 
people to satisfy if their work lacks the structure for meaningfulness. I shall argue that 
37 
38 
39 meaningful work is a fundamental human need because it satisfies our inescapable interests 
40 
41 in being able to experience the constitutive values of autonomy, freedom and dignity. By 
42 
43 
44 requiring social organisation to ensure that all work is structured for meaningfulness, I 
45 
46 distinguish my approach from liberal political theorists, for whom meaningful work, whilst 
47 
48 
an important ideal, is an individual preference which may or may not be expressed in any 
50 
51 particular conception of the good life, and thus cannot be the legitimate target of state 
52 
53 
intervention without coming into conflict with the principle of liberal neutrality. Instead, I 
55 
56 propose that meaningful work is a fundamental human need within a liberal perfectionist 
57 
58 framework (cf. Roessler, 2012). I go on to evaluate the conceptual content of meaningfulness 
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using Wolf’s (2010) concept of a bipartite value of meaningfulness, arguing that, in order to 
1 
2 experience our lives as meaningful, we require certain capabilities for objective valuing and 
3 
4 
5 affective attachment, supported by the recognition of our equal status as co-authorities in the 
6 
7 realm of value. This implies that the possibility of experiencing meaningfulness in work 
8 
9 
depends upon our becoming valuers, situated in social structures allowing us to develop the 
11 
12 relevant capabilities (Sen, 1999) and enabling us to join with others in interpretive sense- 
13 
14 
making (see for example Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001; Wrzesniewski et al, 2003; Bechky, 
16 
17 2003). 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 Meaningfulness in Work: Preference or Need? 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 I claim that meaningfulness is a fundamental human need which liberal political 
28 
29 
theorists have subordinated to their commitment to the principle of liberal neutrality. As a 
31 
32 result, our need for work which is free, autonomous and dignified has been relegated to the 
33 
34 
status of an individual taste or preference, which it is no business of the state’s to promote. 
35 
36 
37 But this settlement is normatively inadequate when the centrality of work in modern societies 
38 
39 makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to remedy non-meaningful work in other action 
40 
41 
contexts. 
43 
44 
45 
46 
The Argument for Meaningful Work as a Preference 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Meaningful work, liberal political theorists complain, is an immodest ideal, because, 
53 
54 by making work central to the possibility of a meaningful life, individual preferences for 
55 
56 meaning in other action contexts, such as the family, community or political life, are crowded 
57 
58 
59 out (Arneson, 1987). Moreover, since meaningful work is constituted by substantive 
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normative commitments to what it is to live a good life, variously including values such as 
1 
2 autonomy (Schwartz, 1982), expressive freedom (Marx, 1844), complex activities (Rawls, 
3 
4 
5 1999 [1971]; Elster, 1986a), or self-respect (Honneth, 1995), then it arbitrarily specifies the 
6 
7 content of the  good  life for all  (see also Michaelson et al,  2012; Rosso et al,  2010). 2  As  a 
8 
9 
result, the substantive normative content of meaningful work violates the liberal principle of 
11 
12 neutrality, which maintains that a liberal democratic state must remain neutral between 
13 
14 
different conceptions of living. Since people possess a diversity of subjective preferences for 
16 
17 the kind of work they wish to undertake, then the state has no legitimate role in specifying 
18 
19 
whether or not that work should be meaningful. 
20 
21 
22 The liberal neutralist is concerned that to legislate for the character of work means 
23 
24 that one kind of good will be prioritised over other equally valuable goods. If the state were 
25 
26 
to privilege meaningful work, then the range of values which people might incorporate into 
28 
29 their conception of living would be narrowed. So, even though we can acknowledge the 
30 
31 
importance of meaningful work for living a good life, meaningful work must be restricted to 
33 
34 the status of an individual preference (Kymlicka, 2002; Miller, 1999; Christman, 2002). To 
35 
36 
do otherwise is to support state sponsored perfectionism which promotes one conception of 
37 
38 
39 living, constraining options for finding meaning in other activities. In arguing against both a 
40 
41 strong and a weak right to meaningful work, Arneson (1987) says: ‘implementing a right to 
42 
43 
44 meaningful work elevates one particular category of good, intrinsic job satisfaction, and 
45 
46 arbitrarily privileges that good and those people who favour it over other equally desirable 
47 
48 
goods and equally wise fans of those other goods’ (ibid: 524-5). For Arneson, meaningful 
50 
51 work is a perfectionist ideal which ‘assumes objective knowledge of the good life for human 
52 
53 
beings, the activities that constitute human flourishing’ (ibid: 520). 
55 
56 As a consequence of similar anxieties, Rawls (1999 [1971]) acknowledges the value 
57 
58 of meaningful work (ibid: 463-4) from the point of view of human flourishing and autonomy 
Conceptualising Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Page 6 
 
 
10 
15 
27 
32 
49 
54 
 
 
(it is one of the human goods), but does not make meaningful work a primary good because 
1 
2 to do so would result in the good of meaningful work being prioritised over equally valuable 
3 
4 
5 human goods. For Rawls, meaningful work is crucial to justice as fairness, because work with 
6 
7 the requisite structure supports the self-respect of citizens, but it need not be part of the good 
8 
9 
for everyone - and to make it so is to advocate perfectionism which breaches the priority of 
11 
12 liberty. Since to legislate for the interior content of work would require interference in the 
13 
14 
available range of values which society allows to be constitutive of the good life, a liberal 
16 
17 democratic state ought to have no interest in the normative content of work, except to ensure 
18 
19 
that work meets basic humane standards, such as health and safety, employment rights, or 
20 
21 
22 welfare support for the unlucky, and that society is organised to secure justice in the equality 
23 
24 of opportunity for the available supply of meaningful work. Where equality of opportunity 
25 
26 
pertains, we do not require guarantees for the interior content of work because the market will 
28 
29 sort out individual preferences for meaningful or non-meaningful work (cf. Nozick, 1974). 
30 
31 
Thus, provided individuals are able to satisfy their preferences for meaning in other spheres 
33 
34 of living, we need have no further concerns for the normative content of the work they 
35 
36 
choose to do. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 The Compensation Argument 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 But constructing meaningful work as an individual preference which can be satisfied in 
47 
48 
the market does not entirely eliminate the intuition that liberal political theory should have 
50 
51 something more to say about the interior content of work. We are uncomfortable concurring 
52 
53 
with Henry Ford’s conclusion that ‘to some types of mind [...] the ideal job is one where the 
55 
3
 
56 creative instinct need not be expressed’ (Breen, 2011: 9). Surely preferences for some kinds 
57 
58 of work over others do not extend to the desire to do work where no expressive human 
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faculty need be exercised? Instead, I argue that it is incumbent upon a liberal democratic state 
1 
2 to  take seriously the  moral  concern  that  the  interior  content  of  much contemporary work 
3 
4 
5 stunts the human flourishing of workers by failing to meet their fundamental human interests 
6 
7 in autonomy, freedom and social recognition. This is because non-meaningful work visits 
8 
9 
extensive harms upon those who have to  do it,  which for  most  people  cannot  be offset  by 
11 
12 compensations in other spheres of action. 
13 
14 
If people are harmed by having to do non-meaningful work, then liberal complacency 
16 
17 with respect to the availability and distribution of meaningful work becomes difficult to 
18 
19 
maintain. After all, despite the remarkable growth in varieties of work, as well as persisting 
20 
21 
22 expectations that work should be attractive or meaningful, work often fails to provide even a 
23 
24 basic standard of living, let alone meets minimal standards for a humane and dignified 
25 
26 
experience of working. A common response to these concerns is some variant of the 
28 
29 Compensation Argument: that work does not have to be meaningful, provided we can find 
30 
31 
our lives as a whole to be meaningful because of our activities in other spheres of living, such 
33 
34 as our status in a community of interest (see Gomberg, 2007). Whilst I admit this to be a 
35 
36 
possibility, I argue that, in contemporary societies, such a strategy is extremely difficult for 
37 
38 
39 most individuals to pursue, because of the ways in which the burdens and benefits of the 
40 
41 work we do shapes our lives as a whole. Work provides access to the roles, practices and 
42 
43 
44 social institutions of society which allocate resources for the development of the capabilities 
45 
46 necessary to secure our social position and economic participation over the life course. 
47 
48 
Furthermore, such social structures embody the values we can potentially incorporate into our 
50 
51 practical identities, grounding the sense that our lives have meaning (Roessler, 2012; cf. 
52 
53 
Korsegaard, 2009). This means that, in no small way, the work we do determines ‘the 
55 
56 distribution of lives’ (Walzer, 1994). Indeed, to such an extent that, when our work lacks the 
57 
58 requisite content in a system which restricts the supply of meaningful work, then we are less 
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likely to develop the human capabilities necessary for equal participation over the life course, 
1 
2 with the result that our lives as a whole are less likely to be structured for meaningfulness. 
3 
4 
5 I argue that the Compensation Argument fails to address three kinds of concerns 
6 
7 arising from a social organisation of work which generates a scarcity of meaningful work: 
8 
9 
firstly, the injustice of an unfair distribution of the most attractive work; secondly, harms to 
11 
12 the capability formation necessary for equal participation in making one’s contribution; and 
13 
14 
thirdly, the diminishing of human well-being. 
16 
17 Firstly, the injustice of an unfair distribution of attractive work - all societies provide 
18 
19 
forms of meaningful work, but it has been meaningful work for the few and not for the many: 
20 
21 
22 Lane (1991) comments that it is the ‘privileged class’ for whom work offers ‘self-direction, 
23 
24 substantive complexity and challenge, variety, little supervision, and intrinsic satisfaction of 
25 
26 
excellence or self-determination’ (ibid: 302). But liberal political theory has had little to say 
28 
29 on the subject of elite expropriation of the most ‘attractive work’ (Fourier, 1983), nor has 
30 
31 
remedying the harms of non-meaningful work been central to theories of liberal egalitarian 
33 
34 justice – and particularly of how social structures operate to shape an individual’s search for 
35 
36 
meaning by enabling or disabling his capabilities for experiencing meaningfulness. Schooler 
37 
38 
39 (2007) theorises that one way in which social structure directly affects psychological 
40 
41 functioning is through occupational conditions, where she defines social structure as ‘the 
42 
43 
44 patterned interrelationships upon a set of individual and organisational statuses, as defined by 
45 
46 the nature of their interacting roles’ (ibid: 371). Schooler concludes that being able to 
47 
48 
undertake complex work, that is, work requiring self-direction, thought and judgement, 
50 
51 depends upon where the job is located in the social structure of society (ibid: 375). This 
52 
53 
suggests that the way in which society arranges the work of social cooperation is unjust, 
55 
56 because it unfairly allocates and unnecessarily constrains the kind of work which is most 
57 
58 likely to enable individuals to satisfy their fundamental human interests in exercising thought 
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and judgement.4 Given the importance of the nature of work for the development of human 
1 
2 capabilities, then justice requires that all work ought to be organised to allow each person to 
3 
4 
5 experience beings and doings which foster vital human capacities for thinking and feeling 
6 
7 (see Sen, 2009). 
8 
9 
Secondly, the harms of non-meaningful work to the capability formation necessary to 
11 
12 secure equal participation over the life course - such harms are not mere inconveniences to be 
13 
14 
remedied elsewhere, because, from poorly developed human capabilities to physical, mental 
16 
17 and psychological deterioration, they affect the flourishing of an individual in every 
18 
19 
dimension of her life (Kohn & Schooler, 1983). Drawing upon Kohn & Schooler, Schwartz 
20 
21 
22 (1982) argues that the prevailing structure of work is degrading because it fails to provide for 
23 
24 the exercise of autonomy which is vital to moral personhood (Schwartz, 1982: 636). Lack of 
25 
26 
autonomy whilst at work affects a person’s ability to lead an autonomous life as a whole, 
28 
29 because the lack of autonomy at work cannot be made up for by full autonomy elsewhere: 
30 
31 
‘When persons work for considerable lengths of time at jobs that involve mainly mechanical 
33 
34 activity, they tend to be made less capable of and less interested in rationally framing, 
35 
36 
pursuing and adjusting their own plans during the rest of their time’ (Schwartz, 1982: 637). 
37 
38 
39 Autonomy is not simply having the capability to form one’s own plans and purposes - it is 
40 
41 also being able to exercise those capacities throughout all aspects of one’s life. Schwartz 
42 
43 
44 (ibid) argues that action contexts cannot be artificially separated, and we cannot assume that 
45 
46 if a person is able to practice autonomy in one sphere, then it does not matter if a person is 
47 
48 
deprived of autonomy in another. Kohn & Schooler (1978; 1983.) find that the structure of 
50 
51 work affects the development of abilities to sustain thought and exercise judgement, and that 
52 
53 
the loss of these abilities carries over into the rest of the person’s life so that those who 
55 
56 undertake challenging and creative market work also demonstrate a preference for leisure 
57 
58 work with similar characteristics. Kornhauser (1965) in his study of factory workers in 
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Detroit found that: ‘factory employment, especially in routine production tasks, does give 
1 
2 evidence of extinguishing workers’ ambition, initiative, and purposeful direction toward life 
3 
4 
5 goals’ (ibid: 252). 
6 
7 Specifically, the harms of non-meaningful work undermine an individual’s ability to 
8 
9 
participate in the work of social cooperation over a lifetime by: stunting the development of 
11 
12 her capabilities for free and autonomous action; undermining her sense of self-esteem and 
13 
14 
self-worth, of her standing relative to others; and thwarting her sense of efficacy, of being 
16 
17 able to act with others upon the world. Together, these harms to capabilities, status, and 
18 
19 
efficacy reduce a person’s ability to build the practical identity necessary to securing a sense 
20 
21 
22 that her life has meaning (cf. Korsegaard, 2009). Thus, work with the right content for 
23 
24 avoiding such harms is an essential experience for those living in contemporary societies who 
25 
26 
have an interest in the development of their human capabilities, the securing of their social 
28 
29 status, and their sense of being able to act with others – which is all people. 
30 
31 
Thirdly, the diminishing of human well-being - the psychology of work and 
33 
34 organisational studies literatures provides compelling empirical evidence that being involved 
35 
36 
in ‘satisfying work’ is fundamental for psychological well-being ‘across various domains of 
37 
38 
39 human functioning’ (Blustein, 2008). Being able to experience meaningful work is linked to 
40 
41 greater reported levels of well-being (Arnold et al, 2007) and to higher levels of job 
42 
43 
44 satisfaction (Sparks & Schenk, 2001). Kohn and Schooler (1983; 1978), in their studies of 
45 
46 how occupational conditions affect cognitive and psychological functioning in a 1970s 
47 
48 
longitudinal research of male workers in the US, present evidence for the pervasive impact of 
50 
51 the interior content of work upon an individual’s sense of competence and self-respect: 
52 
53 
‘Hence, doing substantially complex work tends to increase one’s respect for one’s own 
55 
56 capacities, one’s valuation of self-direction, one’s intellectuality (even in leisure-time 
57 
58 pursuits), and one’s sense that the problems one encounters are manageable’ (ibid: 304). 
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Kohn  &  Schooler  (1983)  looked  at  occupational  self-direction  in  terms  of  substantial 
1 
2 complexity, closeness of supervision, and routinisation, of which substantive complexity was 
3 
4 
5 the  core  concept.  They  define  substantively  complex  work  as  ‘work  that,  in  its  very 
6 
7 substance,  requires  thought  and independent judgement’ (ibid: 106), and identify a  positive 
8 
9 
link between the substantive complexity of work and intellectual flexibility. They observed 
11 
12 that job conditions shape personality (ibid: 47): jobs differing in complexity and self- 
13 
14 
direction were occupied by people with differing levels of cognitive functioning, but over 
16 
17 time the nature of the job led to changes in the intellectual flexibility of job holders. Kohn & 
18 
19 Schooler (1983) conclude: ‘The structural imperatives of the job – particularly those 
20 
21 
22 conditions that facilitate or restrict the exercise of self-direction in work – affect workers’ 
23 
24 values, orientations to the self and society, and cognitive functioning primarily through a 
25 
26 
direct process of learning from the job and generalising what has been learned to other realms 
28 
29 of life’ (ibid: 62-6, 126; see also Kornhauser, 1964). 
30 
31 
The Kohn-Shooler hypothesis receives strong confirmation from a 1978 study of 
33 
34 Polish workers (Kohn & Slomczynski, 1990), and a Japanese study of employed males (Naoi 
35 
36 
& Schooler, 1985). More recently, Hauser & Roan’s (2007) evaluation of the Wisconsin 
37 
38 
39 Longitudinal Study shows there are moderate, but significant, effects of work complexity 
40 
41 upon abstract reasoning abilities in midlife. Moreover, Kornhauser (1965) identifies how the 
42 
43 
44 mental health of workers deteriorated ‘as we move from skilled, responsible, varied types of 
45 
46 work to jobs lower in those respects’ (ibid: 75-76). Physical as well as mental health is 
47 
48 
affected by the interior content of work: for example, the Whitehall I and II studies showed 
50 
51 that lack of control in the work environment, indicated by low job status, was associated with 
52 
53 
an increase in heart disease amongst government office workers (Bosma et al, 1997). 
55 
56 Importantly, Bosma et al find that the objective state of low job control, independent of 
57 
58 subjective reporting of the experience of low job control, has a deleterious impact upon 
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health. They conclude that the harmful effects of disease can be ameliorated by increasing 
1 
2 task variety and providing enriched opportunities for having a voice in decision-making.5 
3 
4 
5 Such studies are highly suggestive of the way work affects the shape of a life, making 
6 
7 the harms experienced at work difficult to remedy elsewhere. Taken together, evidence for 
8 
9 
the harms of non-meaningful work compels us to re-consider the claims of liberal theory - 
11 
12 that the promotion of meaningful work is not state business because it violates liberal 
13 
14 
neutrality. Of course, such research does not allow us to claim that a particularly forthright, 
16 
17 reflective and capable individual doing non-meaningful work cannot find their lives to be 
18 
19 
meaningful because of their activities in other action contexts. But, if the present organisation 
20 
21 
22 of work unjustly distributes, and constrains the supply of, meaningful work, resulting in 
23 
24 distorted capabilities and diminished well-being, then having to do non-meaningful work 
25 
26 
does present formidable barriers to most people being able to do so. 
28 
29 In sum, the Compensation Argument fails because, firstly, our experiences in work 
30 
31 
shapes the capabilities, status and identities which structure our lives as a whole and, 
33 
34 secondly, the course of our life is influenced by the associations we belong to, and the social 
35 
36 
and economic positions we occupy (Young, 1990). Work is demanding, time consuming and, 
37 
38 
39 in complex societies, often requires skills to be developed over many years of training. Being 
40 
41 able to do work with the requisite content structures an individual’s life as whole, but the 
42 
43 
44 supply of meaningful work is restricted. This means that a just society should seek to make 
45 
46 available to everyone work which secures the opportunity to develop important human 
47 
48 
capabilities through being able to do something worthwhile in mutually respectful relations 
50 
51 with others. 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
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The Need for Meaningfulness Argument 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 The  harmfulness  of  non-meaningful  work  is  derived  from  its  inability  to  satisfy 
6 
7 inescapable  human  interests  to  be  able  to experience  freedom, autonomy and dignity. The 
8 
9 
fundamental  human  need  for  meaning,  implied  by  such  interests,  justify  institutional 
11 
12 guarantees for meaningful work, given the centrality of work in modern society. Frankl 
13 
14 
(1978; 1988) claims that the search for meaning, or the ‘will to meaning’, is a universal 
16 
17 human motivation which addresses a fundamental need for a sense that one’s life is worth 
18 
19 
living (see also Maddi, 1971). He says that the need for meaning is satisfied by active 
20 
21 
22 engagement with ordinary human living: ‘Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to 
23 
24 find the right answer to its problems and to fulfil the tasks which it constantly sets for each 
25 
26 
individual’ (Frankl, 1984: 98). In a similar vein: meaning is ‘the ontological significance of 
28 
29 life; making sense of life situations, deriving purpose in existence’ (Martsoff & Mickey, 
30 
31 
1998: 294). Frankl acknowledges that there is a givenness to everyday problems, which 
33 
34 appears to undermine our personal autonomy, but this does not mean that we are not 
35 
36 
choosers, since it is incumbent upon us to take responsibility for resolving the struggles of 
37 
38 
39 everyday living, demanding that we make reflective judgements when choosing the modes of 
40 
41 acting and being appropriate to the situations in which we find ourselves. However, the 
42 
43 
44 necessity for an individual to choose how she responds to everyday situations does not imply 
45 
46 that she bears all the responsibility for finding her life to be meaningful, since the Kohn- 
47 
48 
Schooler research shows us how social structures can enable or disable capabilities, status 
50 
51 and efficacy, thereby determining the resources which society makes available to any 
52 
53 
particular individual in her search for meaning. 
55 
56 Our need for meaning is confirmed by a number of different sources. From 
57 
58 psychology, Baumeister (1991) identifies four needs for meaning: a sense of purpose; a sense 
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of efficacy; being able to view oneself as having positive value or being morally justified; 
1 
2 and a sense of positive self-worth. Blustein (2006) identifies three fundamental needs for 
3 
4 
5 survival, self-determination and relatedness, consistent with the harms of non-meaningful 
6 
7 work already discussed:  stunted capabilities, damaged self-worth,  and  an  inhibited sense of 
8 
9 
efficacy in acting with others upon the world and in forming a practical identity. From moral 
11 
12 philosophy, Wolf (2010) suggests that meaningfulness may be ‘felt to answer to a certain 
13 
14 
kind of human need’ (Wolf, 2010: 26), one where we experience the need for meaningfulness 
16 
17 as urgent and inescapable, because it addresses vital human interests which are necessary for 
18 
19 
human flourishing: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 ‘Our interest in being able to see our lives as worthwhile from some point of 
25 
26 
view external to ourselves, and our interest in being able to see ourselves as 
28 
29 part of an at least notional community that can understand us and that to 
30 
31 
some degree shares our point of view, then, seems to me to be pervasive if 
33 
34 not universal. By engaging in projects of independent value, by protecting, 
35 
36 
preserving, creating, and realizing value the source of which lies outside of 
37 
38 
39 ourselves, we can satisfy these interests. Indeed, it is hard to see how we 
40 
41 could satisfy them in any other way’ (ibid: 31, emphasis added). 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 From political theory, Holbrook (1977) describes the need for meaning as a ‘primary 
47 
48 
human need’ which he claims has been insufficiently recognised in political deliberation. 
50 
51 According to Holbrook, reductionist philosophies have recast men and women into the roles 
52 
53 
of social functionaries in which our human worth has degraded into the value our roles and 
55 
56 status positions have within the formal economy. Holbrook suggests that the frustrated will to 
57 
58 meaning manifests itself in dysfunctions such as compulsive consumerism: ‘If we reduce men 
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to their functions, both in their life and the predominant philosophy of their existence, they 
1 
2 are doomed [...] For man reduced to functional man, there is no possibility of finding any 
3 
4 
5 meaning in his life (ibid: 183). 
6 
7 I argue that individuals who undertake non-meaningful work are less likely to be able 
8 
9 
to satisfy their need for meaning, and are thereby made unacceptably vulnerable to  the harms 
11 
12 of non-meaningful work. Remedying such harms demands a politics of meaningfulness, 
13 
14 
enabled by collective deliberation over the ways in which the interior content of work can be 
16 
17 structured to alleviate unfreedom, heteronomy and misrecognition. Holbrook proposes that 
18 
19 the fundamental question for politics is: ‘what opportunities do societies provide for the 
20 
21 
22 satisfaction of the human need for meaning, and how should societies be organised in order 
23 
24 to provide those opportunities?’ (ibid.). Workers are not motivated purely by external goods - 
25 
26 
they act also out of a fundamental need for living a human kind of life, which goes beyond 
28 
29 the necessity for survival. In the absence of a functioning politics of meaningfulness, workers 
30 
31 
will seek some outlet for their frustrated will to meaning. For example, denied the experience 
33 
34 of autonomy, workers will invent simulations of autonomy in the form of games, or even 
35 
36 
make deliberate mistakes, which Burawoy (1979) describes as the art of ‘making out’. 
37 
38 
39 Amongst numerous testimonies to such practices, is that of the worker who said: ‘Yes, I want 
40 
41 my signature on ‘em too. Sometimes, out of pure meanness, when I make something, I put a 
42 
43 
44 little dent in it. I like to do something to make it really unique. Hit it with a hammer. I 
45 
46 deliberately fuck it up to see if it’ll get by, just so I can say I did it’ (Mike Levevre, 
47 
48 
Steelworker, in Terkel, 1975: 22). In a liberal democratic society, the expressive need for 
50 
51 meaning must take the form of a politics of meaningfulness, which seeks to ensure that 
52 
53 
people are not prevented from experiencing their lives as meaningful because of the work 
55 
56 they do. And I propose that the starting point for such a politics of meaningfulness is to 
57 
58 
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understand meaningful work, not as a preference in the market, but as a fundamental human 
1 
2 need. 
3 
4 
5 Meaningfulness is a Fundamental Human Need 
6 
7 
8 
9 
My claim is that meaningfulness is a fundamental human need because it identifies 
11 
12 and satisfies what is of profound importance for living a human kind of life: ‘human needs 
13 
14 
are the things that must be if human life is to be’ (Reader, 2005: 135). Thomson (2005) 
16 
17 defines a fundamental need as: 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 ‘a non-derivative […] inescapable necessary condition in order for the person 
23 
24 A not to undergo serious harm’ (Thomson, 2005: 175). 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 A fundamental need directs us to what constitutes the normative outlines of a person’s 
30 
31 
life: ‘A person’s needs have a bearing on how he ought to live, but drives have no such 
33 
34 relevance’ (Thomson, 1987: 14). A person is harmed when their fundamental needs remain 
35 
36 
unmet because, in such circumstances, they are ‘deprived of activities and experiences that 
37 
38 
39 answer such interests’ (Thomson, 2005: 177). Thomson (1987) argues that a fundamental 
40 
41 need addresses vital interests that are characteristic of a person’s essential nature. Vital 
42 
43 
44 interests are reasons which lie behind our ‘non-instrumental desires’ (ibid: 64), where an 
45 
46 interest ‘defines the range and type of activities and experiences that partly constitute a 
47 
48 
meaningful, worthwhile life, and it defines the nature of their worth’ (ibid: 76). This means 
50 
51 that harm is not be understand just in terms of thwarted desire satisfaction; instead, harm 
52 
53 
arises when the unavoidable interests a person has in her life being a certain way are ignored 
55 
56 or misrecognised, independent of whether or not her desires have been met. Interests may be 
57 
58 unfulfilled even when desires are satisfied, because people adapt their expectations to the 
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constraints of their circumstances (Elster, 1983): ‘the poor who have never had money are 
1 
2 deprived  and  harmed,  even  though  their  standard  of  living  has  never  actually  fallen’ 
3 
4 
5 (Thomson, 1987: 26). This is because a continuing, unchanging, low quality of living, whilst 
6 
7 it may keep life going, damages a person’s potential to lead a life of human flourishing. Wolf 
8 
9 
(2010)  suggests  that  the  value  of  meaningfulness  addresses  several  important  human 
11 
12 interests: an aspiration to objectivity or being connected to something larger than ourselves; a 
13 
14 
need for self-esteem or being able to judge ourselves and our projects as worthwhile; a sense 
16 
17 of belonging or a wish not to be alone; and existential security (ibid: 28). Our self-esteem 
18 
19 
depends upon being able to assess ourselves and our situation from an external point of view, 
20 
21 
22 and then being able to judge our lives as ‘good and valuable’ against the standards generated 
23 
24 by that exterior standpoint (ibid.) which then becomes a ‘rightful source of pride’ (ibid.). 
25 
26 
Meaningful work is a fundamental human need in this sense because it addresses our 
28 
29 inescapable interest in living a life of human quality. And in modern societies, such 
30 
31 
inescapable interests are satisfied or thwarted in the work we do together in a system of social 
33 
34 cooperation. 
35 
36 
So, fundamental human needs are not simply what are required (negatively) if harm is 
37 
38 
39 to be avoided, but are necessities (positively) for a flourishing life. Furthermore, the 
40 
41 fundamental needs which we attribute to a person depend on what we understand to be their 
42 
43 
44 value as human beings. Reader (2005) defines entrenched needs as needs which are 
45 
46 determined by relatively unchangeable facts of nature, facts which generate a need for work 
47 
48 
of a certain kind. She argues that what we understand by need is grounded in what we 
50 
51 understand the human being to be: for example, in the same way that food is not simply what 
52 
53 
keep human physiology going, work is not simply what provides necessities for continuing to 
55 
56 exist. If the human being is merely biological then work can be provided in any way which 
57 
58 simply sustains life, it will not matter if the work is of poor quality. If, however, the human 
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being is essentially free, rational and social, then this generates a demand that he is treated 
1 
2 with respect in relation to work, which, given the kind of creature he is, requires that the work 
3 
4 
5 he does possesses the requisite interior content. Thus, providing a person with any kind of 
6 
7 work which sustains human existence is not sufficient for satisfying the need for meaningful 
8 
9 
work,  since  a  person  who  has  become  inured  to  non-meaningful  work  will  still  have 
11 
12 inescapable interests in the goods of freedom, autonomy and dignity. A useful illustration is a 
13 
14 
study of mid-life Australians which indicates that poor quality work involving job strain and 
16 
17 insecurity may be as bad for health outcomes as unemployment (Broom et al., 2006). 
18 
19 
I conclude that meaningful work is an ‘inescapably valuable’ (Thomson, 2005: 84) 
20 
21 
22 fundamental human need, because it answers our unavoidable interests in work being 
23 
24 structured by freedom, autonomy and dignity.6 Therefore, to argue for the political 
25 
26 
importance of meaningful work is to make the claim that each individual ought to be treated 
28 
29 as a certain kind of being, one possessing dignity and worth. This means that, in 
30 
31 
contemporary societies, the centrality of work for securing a life of human flourishing makes 
33 
34 evaluating how work inhibits the development of capabilities, status and efficacy a political 
35 
36 
priority. If we accept this claim, then meaningful work is not a mere preference in the market, 
37 
38 
39 but is a regulatory ideal, requiring societies to pay attention to how work meets the 
40 
41 fundamental human needs of its members, by ensuring that the interior content of work has 
42 
43 
44 the requisite structure for meaningfulness. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Liberal Perfectionism and a Politics of Meaningfulness 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Adopting institutional guarantees for the content of work breaks with liberal 
55 
56 neutrality, but this does not entail that the state is entitled to impose a perfectionist ideal of 
57 
58 work upon its members. Rather, several writers have identified that it is possible for a 
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meaningful work ideal to operate within a framework of liberal perfectionism (Roessler, 
1 
2 2012; Keat, 2006, 2009b; Hsieh, 2008; Muirhead, 2004), which Dzur (1998) describes as  ‘an 
3 
4 
5 effort to escape the shortcomings of the predominant liberal conception of the state as neutral 
6 
7 in matters of life-choices without falling   into the overreaching perfectionism of 
8 
9 
neoconservative writings’ (ibid: 668; cf. Raz, 1986; cf. Sher, 1997). In a liberal perfectionist 
11 
12 framework, meaningful work is an open-ended ideal containing an extensive range of values, 
13 
14 
allowing for the development of a diversity of capability formations and practical identities. 
16 
17 So, although a liberal perfectionist framework for meaningful work will ‘reject the role of 
18 
19 
state agents in channelling a person into a particular life’ it will allow ‘the ‘mild illiberality’ 
20 
21 
22 of preventing the degradation or truncation of capabilities’ (Dzur, 1998: 678). However, the 
23 
24 protection of capabilities does not prevent there being a very wide range of activities, 
25 
26 
embodying a plurality of values - although excluding those which are likely to result in 
28 
29 capability deformation of self or others. Consequently, institutional guarantees for 
30 
31 
meaningful work will permit many worthwhile activities containing a plurality of attractive 
33 
34 values, thereby making available a wide diversity of individual interpretations of 
35 
36 
meaningfulness.7 
37 
38 
39 Since people can continue to pursue a broad range of options for living, with the 
40 
41 added security of capability protection, then liberal concerns that institutional guarantees for 
42 
43 
44 meaningful work will limit those options are overstated. Instead, setting meaningful work 
45 
46 within a liberal perfectionist framework ensures that no person’s efforts will be rendered 
47 
48 
futile by finding themselves in work which is structured by heteronomy, unfreedom, and 
50 
51 misrecognition. However, the concerns of liberal neutralists may not be so easy to set aside, 
52 
53 
because any kind of perfectionism runs the risk of compromising our autonomy. Dzur (1998) 
55 
56 addresses these anxieties by making the legitimacy of a liberal perfectionist framework 
57 
58 dependent upon a general capability for collective self-determination in forming the values 
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embodied   within   the   framework   of   acting  and   being.   By  allowing  for   deliberative 
1 
2 engagement in the interpretation of what values add to the meaningfulness of an individual 
3 
4 
5 life,  the  form  that  meaningful  work  might  take  for  any individual  remains  available for 
6 
7 amendment, ensuring that individuals are not coerced into taking work which is subjectively 
8 
9 
unappealing  or   objectively  valueless.   Instead,   deliberation   provides,   not   only  for the 
11 
12 interpretation and multiplication of values, but also for engagement with others over which of 
13 
14 
these values add to the meaning content of a life, disagreeing with them, being challenged 
16 
17 and challenging in return. Through deliberative engagement over values, people develop and 
18 
19 
exercise the political mode of being, opening up possibilities for personal and social change, 
20 
21 
22 in the process finding that being able to express the political mode of being can add, in-itself, 
23 
24 to the meaning content of a life. 
25 
26 
Of course, simply securing institutional guarantees for the availability of meaningful 
28 
29 work for all does not ensure that all individuals will experience their work as meaningful: ‘no 
30 
31 
one can make a success of another person’s life’ (Raz, 1996: 8). Hurka (1993) calls this the 
33 
34 problem of asymmetry where ‘governments can provide necessary but not sufficient 
35 
36 
conditions for the realization of good lives’ (Dzur, 1998: 677). In defending perfectionism, 
37 
38 
39 Hurka (1993) says that seeking the fulfilment of one’s human potential requires the deliberate 
40 
41 engagement of one’s own self in projects and persons: it ‘involves doing things, forming 
42 
43 
44 goals and realizing them in the world. And each person’s doing must be largely her own, 
45 
46 reflecting her energy and commitment’ (ibid: 64). But although the individual herself must 
47 
48 
engage actively with meaning possibilities, governments can ensure that social structures do 
50 
51 not inhibit the individual’s search for meaning, and that they contain a sufficiently wide range 
52 
53 
of positive values conducive to meaning attribution. In sum, liberal perfectionism legitimised 
55 
56 by a deliberative framework requires: firstly, an active orientation of the self towards the 
57 
58 values embodied in substantive ideals, ensuring that values are not simply received, but 
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interpreted, made, accepted or rejected; supported by, secondly, state action to ensure that 
1 
2 social structures enable people to develop the capabilities and acquire the status for becoming 
3 
4 
5 co-authorities in the creation and maintenance of positive values. Finally, this implies a 
6 
7 reordering of economic life to ensure widespread access to democratic participation at work. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 The Value of Meaningfulness 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 We might argue that, in the absence of God, or some transcendental standpoint, the 
19 
20 individual search for meaning in life is nonsensical (Nagel, 1971; Hare, 1972), and our 
21 
22 
lingering need for meaning simply ‘a kind of hangover produced by overindulgence in the 
24 
25 potent brew of metaphysics’ (Kekes, 1986: 79). Whilst acknowledging that we can no longer 
26 
27 
rely upon a transcendental standpoint to satisfy our need for meaning, I argue, with Frankl 
29 
30 (2004), Kekes (1986) and Wolf (2007), that this does not entail having to dispense with all 
31 
32 possibility of being able to attribute meaning to our lives. Wolf (2007) says that ‘an 
33 
34 
35 appropriate response to our status as specks in a vast universe is a concern and aspiration to 
36 
37 have one’s life wrapped up with projects of positive value’ (ibid: 19-20; see also Metz, 2001; 
38 
39 
Wong, 2008). Frankl (2004) says that the search for meaning is satisfied by the ordinary, 
41 
42 everyday experiences towards which we adopt positive and active orientations: ‘The 
43 
44 
perception of meaning boils down to becoming aware of a possibility against the background 
46 
47 of reality, or, more simply, becoming aware of what can be done about a given situation’ 
48 
49 
(ibid: 84). This indicates that meaningfulness, if such exists, must be sought in the mundane 
50 
51 
52 realities of our human lives, in our acting and being together in the messy everyday of human 
53 
54 experience: ‘Our lives have such meaning as we give to them. Meaning is made, not received 
55 
56 
57 or found; it is a human contribution to the world’ (Kekes, 1986: 75). Even though 
58 
59 meaningfulness is not given, but must, instead, be patched together from our experiences of 
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living together, this does not force us to conclude that the value of meaningfulness is either 
1 
2 illusory or cannot be described. Nor is the search for meaningfulness a purely personal affair 
3 
4 
5 for which  we  have  no  collective responsibility,  because  we  have already seen  how social 
6 
7 structures can inhibit or support meaning-making capabilities, rendering us more or less 
8 
9 
vulnerable to the harms of non-meaningful work, and unfairly distributing the available range 
11 
12 of positive values. When interpretive differences become subject to public evaluation and 
13 
14 
judgement through a system of workplace democracy in which workers are co-decision 
16 
17 makers, then such differences become a public resource of positive values, from which we 
18 
19 
can all draw to create meaningful self-identities. Thus, despite the loss of a transcendental 
20 
21 
22 standpoint, the search for meaningfulness remains a legitimate personal and social objective, 
23 
24 where a politics of meaningfulness acts to ensure that all work has the requisite structure for 
25 
26 
meaningfulness (Levy, 2005).8 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Structuring the Value of Meaningfulness 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Because work with the structure for meaningfulness shapes our lives as a whole, an 
37 
38 
39 individual seeking to find her life meaningful will be concerned to ensure that work 
40 
41 contributes to ‘the meaningfulness of her life, in virtue of the way it furthers her life story’, 
42 
43 
44 rather than simply ‘the sum total of good things in life’ (Kauppinen, 2008: 2). I show that 
45 
46 activities with the structure for meaningfulness combine objective valuing with subjective 
47 
48 
attachment in actions which promote what is good for the objects of our actions, whether a 
50 
51 person, an animal, an institution, or a practice. In Wolf’s work on the value of 
52 
53 
meaningfulness, meaningfulness has an overarching structure, given by what has independent 
55 
56 value beyond its value to the individual (Wolf, 2010; see also Wolf, 1982; 1997a; 1997b; 
57 
58 2002; 2007). Wolf (2010) says: 
59 
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1 
2 ‘Our interest in living a meaningful life is not an interest in a life feeling a 
3 
4 
5 certain way, but rather an interest that it be a certain way, specifically, that it 
6 
7 be one that can be appropriately appreciated, admired, or valued by others; 
8 
9 
that it be a life that contributes to or realizes or connects in some positive 
11 
12 way with independent value’ (Wolf, 2010: 32). 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 Wolf describes a bipartite value of meaningfulness which unites objective valuation 
18 
19 with subjective satisfaction: ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective 
20 
21 
22 attractiveness’ (ibid: 9), where the experience of meaningfulness is more likely to occur when 
23 
24 a person becomes actively connected to a worthy object, or something or someone of value, 
25 
26 
such that they are ‘gripped, excited, involved by it’ (Wolf, 1997a: 208; see also Starkey, 
28 
29 2006). She distinguishes the bipartite value of meaningfulness from morality (duty) or 
30 
31 
happiness (feelings of goodness), where meaningfulness is ‘a category of value that is not 
33 
34 reducible to happiness or morality, and that is realized by loving objects worthy of love and 
35 
36 
engaging with them in a positive way’ (Wolf, 2010: 13). Wolf argues that a bipartite value for 
37 
38 
39 meaningfulness is necessary because the morality/self-interest distinction fails to describe all 
40 
41 that is normatively significant about our actions and our relations. In particular, the 
42 
43 
44 morality/self-interest distinction is unable to account for the special ties we feel towards our 
45 
46 ‘ground projects’ – projects which help us to answer the question ‘what reasons do we have 
47 
48 
for living?’ (Wolf, 2010: 56). Williams (1981) refers to ground projects as ‘closely related to 
50 
51 [one’s] existence and [...] to a significant degree give meaning to [one’s] life’ (ibid: 12; see 
52 
53 
also Smart & Williams, 1983). The special significance for meaningfulness of ground 
55 
56 projects comes from how they organise our values and frame our practical identities. Having 
57 
58 ground projects provides us with the material for the narrative formation of our lives, 
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directing us to the responsibilities we have to act appropriately towards the objects for the 
1 
2 sake of which such projects exist. Thus, meaningfulness does not come from the aggregation 
3 
4 
5 of  individual  goods,  but  from  long-lasting,  appropriate  orientations  towards  particular 
6 
7 objects, such as persons, animals, or activities, where orientations are appropriate when they 
8 
9 
point us towards the responsibilities we have to further the good for those objects. 
11 
12 Wolf’s bipartite value of meaningfulness integrates the objective and subjective 
13 
14 
dimensions when affective feelings of attachment, satisfaction or fulfilment are united to an 
16 
17 assessment of the worthiness of the object at which the feelings aim. This implies that in 
18 
19 
order for our ground projects to be meaningful, then what we subjectively feel to be 
20 
21 
22 meaningful must be joined to considerations of what is of independent value: ‘A meaningful 
23 
24 life is a life that a.) the subject finds fulfilling, and b.) contributes to or connects positively 
25 
26 
with something the value of which has its source outside the subject’ (ibid: 20). Wolf argues 
28 
29 that a purely subjective view of meaningfulness as the pursuit of feelings of fulfilment fails to 
30 
31 
address our intuitions concerning the meaningfulness of objects and activities. She illustrates 
33 
34 her argument with Taylor’s (1970) adaption of the figure of Sisyphus, condemned to stone 
35 
36 
rolling, but who is given a drug to change him into someone who enjoys the activity of stone 
37 
38 
39 rolling (Wolf, 2010: 17). The reason Wolf gives for the continued meaninglessness of 
40 
41 Sisyphus’ life is that his efforts are objectively futile and their futility cannot be redeemed 
42 
43 
44 simply because they have become subjectively satisfying (see also Joske, 1974). In Wolf’s 
45 
46 bipartite view, the life of ‘Sisyphus Fulfilled’ cannot be meaningful without the objective 
47 
48 
dimension of being involved in activities which have independent value in a ‘source outside 
50 
51 of oneself’ (Wolf, 2010: 19). 
52 
53 
Thus how ground projects add to the meaning content of a life is not given 
55 
56 automatically by the objective values they represent. Although a project may be 
57 
58 acknowledged by all, including the one whose life is structured by the project, as valuable, 
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this does not mean that the individual doing the  project will  have  an affective sense  of  that 
1 
2 project being meaningful. Objectively, there are ‘many different kinds of lives that are good, 
3 
4 
5 many different activities and relationships that are valuable and can contribute to a life that is 
6 
7 worth living’ (Keat, 2009a: 360), but, subjectively, there is ‘variability with respect to what is 
8 
9 
good for the different subjects’ (ibid.). Consequently, finding meaning in ground projects 
11 
12 requires the exercise of ‘subjective judgement’ (Hicks & King, 2009: 643), involving ‘a 
13 
14 
confirmatory search for information suggesting that one’s life is meaningful’ (ibid: 644). The 
16 
17 search for information is the search for validation, for affirmation of one’s judgements, out of 
18 
19 
which we construct the objective value of our doings and beings. 
20 
21 
22 Subjective satisfactions contribute to a life of meaning when they arise from 
23 
24 engagements with worthy objects: ‘what is valuable is that in one’s life we actively (and 
25 
26 
lovingly) engage in projects that give rise to this feeling, when the projects in question can be 
28 
29 seen to have a certain kind of objective value’ (ibid: 27). This includes what is appropriate for 
30 
31 
the particular kinds of creatures we are. Sisyphus Fulfilled fails to meet the objective 
33 
34 condition of the value of meaningfulness, but I suggest that the full explanation for the 
35 
36 
continued meaninglessness of Sisyphus’s activities lies, not just in the structure of the action, 
37 
38 
39 but in the failure to be attentive to the kind of creature Sisyphus is. Even though Sisyphus is 
40 
41 now subjectively satisfied, the pointlessness of the task makes it unworthy of a creature who 
42 
43 
44 is capable of more complex and meaningful feats, and to whom violence had to be done in 
45 
46 order to make him into the kind of creature who would experience such work as fulfilling. It 
47 
48 
is disrespectful of our status as human beings if the meaning of our valued activities or 
50 
51 ground projects is reduced to manipulated feelings of satisfaction. This suggests that 
52 
53 
fulfilment which is worth experiencing must contain ‘a cognitive component that requires 
55 
56 seeing the source or object of fulfilment as being, in some independent way, good or 
57 
58 worthwhile’ (Wolf, 2010: 24). Some actions are inappropriate for a creature whose 
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fundamental needs are not to be met in any way whatsoever, but in a manner consistent with 
1 
2 the kind of creature he is, that is, one who has a fundamental human need to express free, 
3 
4 
autonomous acts directed towards worthy objects in respectful association with others.9 
6 
7 
8 
9 
The Capability for Objective Valuing: Worthy Objects in the Objective Dimension 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Whilst the bipartite value of meaningfulness provides us with the means to identify 
16 
17 which activities have the structure for meaningfulness, it does not tell us how these activities 
18 
19 
translate into the actual experience of meaningfulness for any particular individual. I propose 
20 
21 
22 that to experience meaningfulness, we need to become valuers, able to recognise what has 
23 
24 objective worth, and to affectively appropriate positive values to our lives. When we become 
25 
26 
valuers, we provide ourselves with the opportunity to become ‘appropriately related to what 
28 
29 has worth’ (Wolf, 2010: 179) by developing the capabilities for objective valuation and 
30 
31 
subjective attachment, through which we learn to appreciate what objects have value, and to 
33 
34 generate the relevant orientations towards those objects. I argue that the relevant orientations 
35 
36 
are those which motivate the right actions consistent with the nature of the object: for 
37 
38 
39 example, unconditional love when parenting a child or respectful care when looking after an 
40 
41 aged relative. In addition, becoming a valuer must be incorporated into our practical 
42 
43 
44 identities, where we see ourselves as having the status as co-authorities entitled both to make 
45 
46 judgements upon the worthiness of objects and to decide upon how to act towards those 
47 
48 
objects appropriately. However, developing the capabilities and practical identity necessary 
50 
51 for becoming a valuer depends upon our being able to engage in activities which connect us 
52 
53 
to things that matter: ‘connecting with something of worth in a way that enables the direct 
55 
56 appreciation of the value of one’s activity’ (ibid: 189). This is because, by investing their 
57 
58 objects with meaning and positive values, and educating our capacities for judging and 
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feeling,  these  connections  are  intrinsically  valuable:  ‘we  flourish  through  (meritorious) 
1 
2 activity such as parenting and music making, because these activities involve an  appreciation 
3 
4 
5 of things that matter, things with worth’ (ibid: 179). Although purposes derive from the needs 
6 
7 and characteristics of worthy objects, they are not just read off from worthy objects, but are 
8 
9 
shaped  and  created  by  processes  of  interpretation,  disagreement  and  consensus.  In turn, 
11 
12 objects themselves are constructed: for example, in contrast to earlier historical periods, the 
13 
14 
object of modern parenting is the child who is entitled to an extended period of care, 
16 
17 education and development, exempting them from hard labour, early marriage or adult 
18 
19 
responsibilities. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 The Purpose of Work 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 The purposes we create to attend to worthy objects are shaped, in part, by what we 
30 
31 
understand to be the final ends of work. If work is just to ensure survival or to provide a 
33 
34 surplus for leisure, then work is simply a means to an end, and activities can be structured in 
35 
36 
any way which achieves the relevant ends, including by ‘unpleasant toil’ (Sayers, 2005: 608). 
37 
38 
39 Drawing upon Marx’s concept of alienated work, in which we ‘relate to our own product or 
40 
41 activity as if it is something independent or hostile’ (ibid: 609), Sayers opposes this 
42 
43 
44 instrumental view of work to work as an end-in-itself, that is ‘productive, creative activity’ 
45 
46 which should be ‘an expression and confirmation of our creative powers’ (ibid: 610; see 
47 
48 
Marx 1978 [1867]). Thus, in work as an end-in-itself, the purpose of work is to achieve self- 
50 
51 realisation by becoming productive and creative beings. However, an important feature of 
52 
53 
non-alienated work is that it is not arrived at through individual effort alone, but through 
55 
56 inter-dependency and cooperation, specifically through the reconciliation and repair 
57 
58 (Spelman, 2003) of our relations to self, others, our products and the world. In alienated 
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work, the worker is divorced from his skills and capabilities when the content of work 
1 
2 inhibits his sense of autonomy over his actions. He is separated from his own self when the 
3 
4 
5 relations and circumstances of work fail to support his sense of identity as an efficacious, 
6 
7 distinct person; and he is divided from others, such that he values the other person only for 
8 
9 
her position in the division of labour, making the mutual needs, which should be a source of 
11 
12 solidarity, ‘a source of tactical advantage’ (Miller, 2003). In work as an end-in-itself, the 
13 
14 
purpose of work is to restore our alienated relations by making of the world a home, where 
16 
17 ‘our coming to be at home in our world is not our natural and initial condition; rather it is an 
18 
19 
achievement, a result of human activity and work, both individual and social’ (Sayers, 2005: 
20 
21 
22 613). Meaningful work is therefore work which has both the object and the activity in mind. 
23 
24 By developing the capability for objective valuing, we become participants in constructing 
25 
26 
purposes consistent with the interests of worthy objects, through activities which are 
28 
29 characterised by autonomy, freedom and dignity. And by attending to both the object and the 
30 
31 
activity, we create and repair the human world, make it a habitation suitable for human 
33 
34 flourishing. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 Creating Purposes 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 A life of meaning is a life with a purpose: ‘A life has point when it is oriented toward goals 
45 
46 which transcend the limits of the individual, goals which are more valuable than the 
47 
48 
subjective concerns of any one person’ (Levy, 2005: 178). But the life of a person does not 
50 
51 reduce to her goals or purposes: ‘It is degrading for a man to be regarded as merely serving a 
52 
53 
purpose’ (Baier, 1957: 120). Besides, not all purposes are equally worthwhile - some goals 
55 
56 are trivial, reprehensible or even wicked. Furthermore, a life defined by its goals is vulnerable 
57 
58 to devaluation, as a consequence either of failure, or of over-achievement. For example, 
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Wiggins’s (1998) farmer, trapped in a cycle of endless achievement in which the farmer buys 
1 
2 land to grow corn to feed pigs, illustrates the pointlessness of the repetitious recreation of the 
3 
4 
5 same goal without resolution, unconnected to a wider structure of value. Even though ‘lives 
6 
7 do not acquire meaning just in case they achieve goals’ (Levy, 2005: 178), goals can add to 
8 
9 
the meaning content of a life. This is so, even where the activities concerned lack intrinsic 
11 
12 merit, as is the case with many kinds of hard work (Walzer, 1983), since those engaged in 
13 
14 
dirty, hard or menial work are not unjustified in claiming meaning for those activities when 
16 
17 their ends benefit society; for example, cleaning sewers is vital for public health. In case 
18 
19 
study research of several workplaces from banks to retail, Doherty (2009) found that work 
20 
21 
22 interpreted from ‘the outside’ as unskilled, poor quality work, was often seen by workers 
23 
24 themselves as invested in complex social interactions and meaning: ‘The job I’m doing now 
25 
26 
(customer service) is mostly pluses because I like dealing with people and I like arguing! I 
28 
29 love the job I’m doing now (Deirdre)’ (ibid: 92). Thus, when sufficient political space is 
30 
31 
given to interpretive sense-making, then even purposes judged as less worthwhile by society 
33 
34 can acquire valuable meaning for those doing them – and when these judgements are brought 
35 
36 
into public deliberation through democratic practices, they have the potential to reframe 
37 
38 
39 society’s valuation of the worthiness of activities. 
40 
41 Democratic deliberation provides a way to construct the objective basis for 
42 
43 
44 independent value, allowing   individuals to deploy   meaning-making capabilities in 
45 
46 interpreting, shaping and ordering purposes. For example, Lawrence (1977) suggests that 
47 
48 
people in the same organisation will pursue different types of primary purposes. They will 
50 
51 pursue the normative primary task, or the official version of the task; the existential primary 
52 
53 
task or the one they believe they are doing; or the phenomenal primary task or the task which 
55 
56 can be deduced from their behaviour. The distances between formal description of the 
57 
58 purpose, beliefs about the purpose and actual behaviours open out the deliberative space for 
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contestation and interpretive differences over purposes. This directs us to the potential of 
1 
2 democratic practices at the level of the task to bring into public view interpretive differences 
3 
4 
5 over values, meanings, and purposes. We should be careful, however, not to conclude that, 
6 
7 just by filtering the meaning of poor quality work through deliberative public evaluation, we 
8 
9 
have satisfied all normative concerns with respect to the content of work, since ‘boring work 
11 
12 is boring work’ (Carter, 2003: 179). If the work fails to provide sufficient meaning in an 
13 
14 
objective sense, then it must be reorganised to ensure that it contains a sufficient range of 
16 
17 worthy objects embodying attractive values, where activities, to be consistent with the ends 
18 
19 
of work as self-realisation and reconciliation, are structured by autonomy, freedom, and 
20 
21 
22 dignity. Moreover, to be susceptible to meaning appropriation, purposes need to be contained 
23 
24 within wider structures of value, such as the roles, practices and institutions which make up 
25 
26 
the fabric of a system of social cooperation, where to be a practice participant is also to be 
28 
29 afforded a vantage point for deliberation with others over the value of those objects, 
30 
31 
accessing information about the worthiness of objects, and of assessing whether our actions 
33 
34 and orientations are appropriate for the objects in question (see MacIntyre, 1981). 
35 
36 
In sum, the purposes of work are concerned both with the object and the activity. The 
37 
38 
39 object is constructed through interpretive sense-making, and the activity is both a mediator 
40 
41 for self-realisation and a means to attend to the needs of worthy objects. The capability for 
42 
43 
44 objective valuing is formed and exercised through institutional structures of value which 
45 
46 enable us to engage with others in determining the purposes and ends of work. Through the 
47 
48 
practice of objective valuing, we join with others in creation and maintenance of positive 
50 
51 values, which generates both objects and activities consistent with the value of 
52 
53 
meaningfulness, thereby affirming and validating our appropriation of worthy objects to the 
55 
56 meaning content of our lives. 
57 
58 
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The Capability for Subjective Attachment: Affective Appropriation in the Subjective 
1 
2 Dimension 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Recognition of the value of worthy objects, and even active involvement with those 
8 
9 
worthy objects  through  public practices,  does  not  guarantee that  a  person will  find  those 
11 
12 objects and activities to be personally meaningful, in the absence of their affective 
13 
14 
incorporation into the meaning content of that person’s life. Practices and projects are sources 
16 
17 of worthy objects and sites for the development of the relevant capabilities for 
18 
19 
meaningfulness, but, to secure the value of meaningfulness to their lives, a person must also 
20 
21 
22 experience those worthy objects as subjectively attractive. Realising subjective attractiveness 
23 
24 requires that a person be able to incorporate worthy objects into her life, such that her life is 
25 
26 
shaped by the orientations and actions promoting the good for the worthy objects in question. 
28 
29 But there may be occasions when, although we may recognise the objective value of things, 
30 
31 
we may be unable to experience them as valuable for our own lives. Raz (2001), for example, 
33 
34 says that the attempt to revive the mood of a depressed person by pointing out to them the 
35 
36 
beauties and treasures of the world is unlikely to be successful: ‘Their problem is not the 
37 
38 
39 absence of value in the world but the absence of meaning in their lives’ (ibid: 19). In short, 
40 
41 without affective attachment, worthy objects cannot, on their own, add to the meaning 
42 
43 
44 content of a life: ‘Concrete attachments are good for those whose attachments they are; their 
45 
46 value is within the sphere of personal meaning. The uniqueness of an object or pursuit 
47 
48 
established by an attachment is uniqueness to one person, not uniqueness impersonally 
50 
51 judged’ (Raz, 2001: 39). This means that, for worthwhile activities to add to the meaning 
52 
53 
content of our lives, we need to experience them as subjectively attractive: ‘A housewife and 
55 
56 mother, a doctor, or a bus driver may be competently doing a socially valuable job, but 
57 
58 because she is not engaged by her work (or, as we are assuming, by anything else in her life), 
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she has no categorical desires that give her a reason to live’ (Wolf, 1997: 211). And this 
1 
2 implies limits to public practices as a source of meaningfulness because, although public 
3 
4 
5 acknowledgement of value or worthiness reinforces our affective engagement with values, 
6 
7 public acknowledgement will not compensate for a person finding an activity insufficiently 
8 
9 
attractive.   An   achievement   can   be   objectively   and   publically   valued   as   a genuine 
11 
12 contribution, but still be subjectively disvalued by the individual whose achievement it is. 
13 
14 
Arneson (2000) claims that the slave’s achievements are not diminished by his state of 
16 
17 slavery – they can still add to the perfection of his life, although he qualifies this by adding 
18 
19 ‘no doubt achievement does more to enhance an agent’s life, other things being equal, when 
20 
21 
22 the agent wholeheartedly endorses the doing and properly rates its value’ (ibid: 57). Arneson 
23 
24 does not find that the absence of subjective endorsement prevents an exceptional achievement 
25 
26 
from counting towards the perfection of a person’s life, but, in my application of the bipartite 
28 
29 value of meaningfulness to work, it would constitute a formidable barrier to the 
30 
31 
meaningfulness of that person’s life. 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Appropriation and Affective Attachment 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 I argue that for persons, objects and activities of value to be constitutive of the 
42 
43 
44 meaning content of our lives, we must make them our own through a process of affective 
45 
46 appropriation. Affective appropriation in the bipartite value of meaningfulness implies 
47 
48 
legitimate emotional engagement with worthy objects where legitimacy is given by how our 
50 
51 emotions direct us toward what is good for worthy objects. As a consequence of affective 
52 
53 
appropriation, we acknowledge them as ours because of the particular place they have within 
55 
56 our lives which gives us reasons to regard our life as worth living; but we also acknowledge 
57 
58 
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them as ours because their objective value confirms that we are right to give them such 
1 
2 prominence in our lives: 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 ‘The personal meaning of objects, causes and pursuits depends upon their 
8 
9 
impersonal value, and is conditional upon it. But things of value have to be 
11 
12 appropriated by us to endow our lives with meaning, meaning which is a 
13 
14 
precondition for life being either a success or a failure’ (Raz, 2001: 20). 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Drawing on Raz’s identification of the need for appropriation of ‘things of value’, I 
20 
21 
22 understand appropriation not in the pejorative sense of exploitation, but as an active 
23 
24 orientation of one’s self to the particular value of worthy objects, requiring a form of 
25 
26 
emotional engagement which does not seek to secure in ourselves a satisfying state of mind, 
28 
29 but seeks instead what is good for worthy objects. Consequently, not just any kind of 
30 
31 
emotional state will do for meaning appropriation - some emotions directed at worthy objects 
33 
34 are not legitimate if they lead to abuse, or simply misrecognition, of what constitutes the 
35 
36 
good for the object. This suggests that we need an account of emotional engagement which 
37 
38 
39 describes the kind of affective appropriation of worthy objects capable of fostering the 
40 
41 correct orientations towards the objects in question. Nussbaum (2001) characterises emotions 
42 
43 
44 as ‘forms of judgement’ (ibid: 22) which, in their intensity and particularity, are 
45 
46 ‘acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency’ (ibid.). Because they are 
47 
48 
directed at objects (goals, projects, persons) constituting our vital interests in our conception 
50 
51 of the good life, such emotions indicate where we are vulnerable to reversion, loss or harm: 
52 
53 
‘The emotional importance of the projects that one values is revealed in the whole complex 
55 
56 array of feelings to which one becomes vulnerable by virtue of one’s engagement with them’ 
57 
58 (Scheffler, 2006: 254; see also Reader, 2007). Our sense of meaning, our place in the world, 
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is dependent upon the flourishing of the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning 
1 
2 content  of  our  lives,  where  the  type  and  intensity  of  our  emotions  indicate  the relative 
3 
4 
5 importance  of  various  objects,  and  how  they  structure  our  lives  as  a  whole. Nussbaum 
6 
7 specifies the normative dimensions of the relevant emotions in relation to their objects  which 
8 
9 
explains also the nature of our vulnerability: firstly, our emotions have an object (and in the 
11 
12 value of meaningfulness, it is a worthy object); secondly, the kind of emotion which it is 
13 
14 
appropriate for us to experience is ‘internal’ to the object (Nussbaum, 2001: 27), that is, the 
16 
17 nature of the object, in addition to the place it occupies in our lives, specifies the correct 
18 
19 
emotional orientation; thirdly, our beliefs about the object generate types of emotions, for 
20 
21 
22 example, the anger we experience if a loved one is threatened (ibid: 29); and fourthly, the 
23 
24 kind and intensity of our emotions signals the value of the object, they are ‘concerned with 
25 
26 
value, they see their object as invested with value or importance’ (ibid: 30). Thus, our 
28 
29 emotions alert us to what is important in our lives, in their intensity and persistence they 
30 
31 
indicate the shape of our lives, and direct us to how the judgements we make are legitimate 
33 
34 when they are structured by what is good for the worthy objects to which we are affectively 
35 
36 
engaged. 
37 
38 
39 But our emotions do not simply happen to us, rendering us out of control and unable to 
40 
41 exercise freedom of choice (cf. Wallace, 1993). Instead, emotions are susceptible to change 
42 
43 
44 in the light of new evaluations and judgements, potentially leading to reassessments of the 
45 
46 worthiness of objects: ‘Transformation in feeling for oneself is a transformation in 
47 
48 
judgements about the self’ (Gilligan, 1982). Developed emotions are person-specific, as well 
50 
51 as object-appropriate; that is, they are constituted by the place the object has in the life of the 
52 
53 
person whose emotions they are, as well as by the nature of the object: ‘they insist on the real 
55 
56 importance of their object, but they also embody the person’s own commitment to the object 
57 
58 as a part of her scheme of ends’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 33). They are eudaimonistic (ibid: 31) 
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because they are concerned with both the person’s, and the object’s, flourishing, and they 
1 
2 specify the  appropriate  actions  we should  take  towards  worthy objects,  such  as deciding, 
3 
4 
5 making, preserving, caring and restoring (cf. Spelman, 2003). This means that emotions 
6 
7 which  enable  legitimate  affective  appropriation  of  worthy objects  are  ‘merited emotions’ 
8 
9 
(Kauppinen, 2008), that is, they are emotions which are structured by the recognition that the 
11 
12 objective worthiness of the object merits our emotional engagement with the object 
13 
14 
(Kauppinen, 2008). In addition, they are merited because they reflect legitimate attachments; 
16 
17 for example, unmerited emotions include feelings of attachment which keep us in destructive 
18 
19 
personal relationships, or foster misplaced loyalty to dysfunctional practices or institutions. 
20 
21 
22 ‘Merited emotions’ help us to forgo personal welfare maximisation: they support our 
23 
24 recognition that our vulnerability to loss or harm of worthy objects is alleviated if we act to 
25 
26 
fulfil our responsibilities of care towards these objects, even if such actions are not 
28 
29 maximally beneficial to ourselves. In sum, emotional engagement enables legitimate affective 
30 
31 
appropriation of worthy objects in two ways: firstly, when the objects are worthy of our 
33 
34 emotional engagement, and secondly, when our emotions direct our attention and actions 
35 
36 
towards what is good for worthy objects. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Equal Co-Authorities in the Realm of Value 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 In my account of the bipartite value of meaningfulness, I show that being able to 
47 
48 
experience meaningfulness depends not only upon our becoming valuers, able to exercise the 
50 
51 capabilities for objective valuing and affective attachment, but also upon our equal status as 
52 
53 
co-authorities in the realm of value. This is because to be involved in the co-creation of 
55 
56 meaning, we need to experience ourselves as worthy of the entitlement to speak and be heard, 
57 
58 where participating in meaning-making is necessary for experiencing our lives as worthwhile: 
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‘human  beings  denied  the  opportunity to  exercise  their  world-building  capacities  live an 
1 
2 impoverished  life,  a  life  that  is  somehow  less  human,  a  life  without  freedom,  without 
3 
4 
5 happiness’ (Honig, 1993: 112). Christiano (2005) proposes that the fundamentally relevant 
6 
7 feature of the  person  which grounds  the principle of egalitarian justice  is  ‘their authority in 
8 
9 
the realm of value’ (ibid: 49) and it is in virtue of each person’s status as authorities that we 
11 
12 give each person their due (ibid.). Potentially, all persons possess the capabilities for 
13 
14 
objective valuing and subjective attachment, including being able to appreciate, to engage 
16 
17 with, and to produce values. This means that being a valuer applies to all persons with no 
18 
19 
distinctions which are relevant to a theory of justice: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 ‘The humanity of a person is that person’s capacity to recognise, appreciate, 
25 
26 
engage with, harmonise with, and produce intrinsic goods. It is in virtue of 
28 
29 this feature of human beings that they bring something unique and distinctive 
30 
31 
to the world [...] Humans do not merely cause these things to come about, as 
33 
34 say a river causes the condition of life to come about; they bring about these 
35 
36 
things self-consciously and through their own activity because they 
37 
38 
39 appreciate them’ (ibid: 47-48). 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 But, although developing one’s human potential contributes to an activity being 
45 
46 meaningful, simply realising one’s capacities is not the same as having a sense of one’s life 
47 
48 
being worth living, since ‘a slave might be forced to do theoretical physics and to do it 
50 
51 surprisingly well’ (Arneson, 2000: 44). For meaningfulness, we must also find the project to 
52 
53 
be subjectively attractive, as well as judged objectively worthwhile against the values we 
55 
56 have incorporated into our practical identities – and we maintain a sense of meaning by 
57 
58 continuing to care about what we are doing in relation to worthy objects. And it is in the 
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interlocking   of   the   objective   and   subjective   dimensions   of   the   bipartite   value   of 
1 
2 meaningfulness that we ensure a meaningful activity is not only recognised as objectively 
3 
4 
5 valuable  and  subjectively  engaging,  but  is  experienced  as  such  by  the  individual whose 
6 
7 activity it  is:  ‘meaning  consists  of engagement  in  an  activity that  is  not only subjectively 
8 
9 
engaging, but that is also subjectively experienced as being meaningful’ (Kekes, 1986:  97). 
11 
12 This requires a ‘fittingness between certain kinds of activities and the potential for fulfilment’ 
13 
14 
which Wolf calls Fitting Fulfilment (Wolf, 1997: 216-7; see also Muirhead, 2004). Fitting 
16 
17 Fulfilment arises when there is a match between activities with the requisite structure for 
18 
19 
capability formation and the individual’s own valuations of which activities and capability 
20 
21 
22 formations are worth pursuing. I argue that Fitting Fulfilment is more likely to be realised 
23 
24 when we become valuers: that is, when we develop the capabilities relevant to realising the 
25 
26 
bipartite value of meaningfulness, given by the capabilities for objective valuing and 
28 
29 subjective attachment, and where we possess a sense of our worthiness to be valuers. 
30 
31 
In sum, we need both the capabilities for meaningfulness and a sense of our status as 
33 
34 co-authorities to give us confidence that we are entitled to engage with others in the co- 
35 
36 
creation of values; this means that we must be situated in social contexts which affirm our 
37 
38 
39 equal status as co-authorities, and support our development of the ‘human capacity for 
40 
41 building, preserving, and caring for a world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live 
42 
43 
44 in for those who come after us’ (Arendt, 1977 [1954], 95). Thus, the two capabilities united 
45 
46 to status specify the manner in which the objective and subjective dimensions of the bipartite 
47 
48 
value of meaningfulness can be integrated in actual human lives. 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Conclusion 
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I have argued that the concept of meaningful work deserves wider intellectual and 
1 
2 political attention because our inescapable interests in freedom, autonomy and  dignity makes 
3 
4 
5 meaningful  work  a  fundamental  human  need.  Although  we  are  now  exhorted  to  find 
6 
7 satisfaction and self-fulfilment in consumption, Morris’s call for dignified and humane labour 
8 
9 
retains  a toehold  in  our  imaginings  of  what  a flourishing human  life ought  to  look  like. 
11 
12 Indeed, Morris’s comment upon the purchase of goods, ‘Tis the lives of men you buy’ 
13 
14 
(Morris, 1884), indicates how we might link the moral and political dimensions of 
16 
17 consumption and production. This is because if we acquire goods from the oppressions of 
18 
19 
others then we compromise the possibilities for our own life - if one life can be made 
20 
21 
22 vulnerable because of the work he or she does, then so can the life of any man or woman. 
23 
24 Consumers can be satisfied even where producers are exploited, alienated, or otherwise 
25 
26 
harmed, but consumers are also producers with interests in not being exploited, alienated, or 
28 
29 subjected to undignified work. Because we all shared common vulnerabilities to the lack of 
30 
31 
meaningful work, we therefore have common cause in ensuring that all work is meaningful 
33 
34 work, constituted by the goods of autonomy, freedom and dignity. And the starting point for 
35 
36 
such a political project is the recognition that meaningful is a fundamental human need. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
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44 ‘inaccessible options’, it is rational to adjust one’s preferences to the available choice set (Elster, 1993). In the 
45 case of the fox who desires the out of reach sweet grapes at the top of the tree, his desire is modified so that, 
6 not only does he learn to like the sour grapes at the bottom of the tree, but he loses awareness of the 
48 existence of the sweet grapes. 
49 
7 Adopting a liberal perfectionist framework means giving up strict neutrality. The value of neutrality lies in the 
50 space it provides for individual autonomy and freedom of choice. Since these are also constitutive values of my 
51 concept of meaningful work, then construing meaningful work within a liberal perfectionist framework would 
52 seem to introduce a contradiction. If we specify the good life as characterised by autonomy, then do we not 
53 thereby diminish autonomy by restricting non-autonomous forms of living. However, the variety of positive 
54 values and meanings which my concept of meaningful work would allow preserves wide discretion for 
55 individuals to select the meanings that have value to them (see Roessler, 2012). Furthermore, I draw upon 
56 Sen’s capability approach to specify two capabilities relevant to experiencing the value of meaningfulness 
57 which requires that, to be complete, any capability must include the freedom not to turn that capability into a 
58 functioning (Sen, 1999). Applied to the capabilities for objective valuing and affective attachment, this means 
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1 that people retain the freedom to choose not to experience meaningful work, or even to engage in meaning- 
2 making with others. 
3 
8 
Alfes, Truss, Soane, Rees, & Gatenby (2010) report that ‘the two most important drivers of [employee] 
4 engagement are meaningfulness of work and employee voice’ (ibid: 36). 
5 
9 The objective/subjective distinction has been identified by several writers (Ciulla, 2000; see also Laborem 
6 Exercens). Cuilla (2002) describes the intrinsic objective dimension of meaningful work as follows: ‘meaningful 
7 work, like a meaningful life, is morally worthy work undertaken in a morally worthy organisation’ (ibid: 225). I 
8 make a distinction between worthy objects and the objective dimensions of the work activity, which in my 
9 conception of meaningful work are autonomy, freedom and dignity. A worthy object might be a material 
11 object, a person, an animal, an idea, a practice, a project, an eco-system, or some set of institutional 
12 arrangements which order the human world. However, this does not mean that we attend to the interests of 
13 these worthy objects in ways which render harm to ourselves, through whom the activity occurs (since we are 
14 also worthy objects). Instead, to be consistent with the value of meaningfulness, our actions must be 
15 structured by the objective characteristics of autonomy, freedom and dignity. In my application of Wolf’s 
16 bipartite value of meaningfulness, I am concerned to describe how objectivity and subjectivity are to be 
17 integrated. Hence, being attentive to worthy objects requires an emotional engagement which is both 
18 satisfying to us because we are able to experience the objective features of meaningful work, and represents 
19 an appropriate response to the nature of the object. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to 
20 clarify my distinction between worthy objects and the objective features of meaningful work. 
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